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Abstract:This paper considers a two-period model in which two labour-managed firms can use
inventory investment as a strategic device. In the first period, each firm simultaneously and
independently chooses how much it sells in the current market and the level of inventory it
holds for the second-period market. The paper shows the reaction curves in the model with
inventories. The paper finds that inventories may be used by labour-managed firms to
facilitate tacit collusion.
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Introduction
Labour-managed firms have existed in Western economies since the advent of the
factory system. The oldest surviving labour-managed firms in the United Kingdom
and Italy appeared in the nineteenth century (Bonin et al. 1993). After the Second
World War, the right to manage the firm in the former Yugoslavia was, within the
limits determined by law, in the hands of its employees (Furubotn and Pejovich,
1970). The labour-managed firm in all Western European countries grew
significantly between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, for example, from 4,370
firms in 1970 to 11,203 in 1982 in Italy and from 522 to 933 firms in France over the
same period. Furthermore, in the United Kingdom the number of labour-managed
firms rose by almost 1,000% and employment by 133% between 1976 and 1981
(Estrin, 1985). In the United States, the most notable examples of labour-managed
firms are in the plywood industry in the Pacific Northwest where they have been in
existence since 1921, and during the 1950s, they contributed as much as 25 percent of
the industry’s total output (Bonin et al. 1993). Furthermore, in China, the
market-oriented economic reform has given much greater autonomy to state and
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collective enterprises’ managers to make production, investment and marketing
decisions. Meng and Perkins (1998) find that the state and the collective sectors
behave more like labour-managed firms in that they try to maximize income per
worker rather than profit.
The pioneering work on a theoretical model of a labour-managed firm was
conducted by Ward (1958). Since then, many economists have studied the behaviour
of labour-managed firms.1 For example, Laffont and Moreaux (1985) examine the
welfare properties of free-entry Cournot equilibria in labour-managed economies and 
show that Cournot equilibria are efficient provided that the market is sufficiently
large. Okuguchi (1986) compares the Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium prices for
the labour-managed oligopoly under product differentiation and shows that the
Cournot equilibrium prices are not lower than the Bertrand ones. Zhang (1993)
applies a Dixit (1980)-Bulow et al. (1985a) framework of entry deterrence to a
labour-managed industry and shows that a labour-managed incumbent has a greater
incentive to hold excess capacity to deter entry than corresponding a
profit-maximizing incumbent. Okuguchi (1993) examines two models of duopoly
with product differentiation and with only labour-managed firms, in one of which
two firms’ strategies are outputs (labour-managed Cournot duopoly) and prices
become strategic variables in the other (labour-managed Bertrand duopoly). He
shows that reaction functions are upward-sloping under general conditions in both
labour-managed Bertrand and Cournot duopolies with product differentiation.
Lambertini and Rossini (1998) analyse the behaviour of labour-managed firms in a
two-stage Cournot duopoly model with capital strategic interaction and show that
labour-managed firms choose their capital commitments according to the level of
interest rate, unlike what usually happens when only profit-maximizing firms operate 
in the market. Lambertini (2001) examines a spatial differentiation duopoly model
and shows that if both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, 
if and only if the setup cost is low enough. There are many further studies, such as
Hill and Waterson (1983), Neary (1988), Drago and Turnbull (1992), Haruna (1996), 
Kamshad (1997), Kihlstrom and Laffont (2002) and Ohnishi (2009). However, there
are few models in which labour-managed firms manage inventories as a strategic
device.
Therefore, we study a two-period model in which two labour-managed firms are
allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device.2 In the first period, each
labour-managed firm simultaneously and independently chooses how much it sells in 
the current market and the level of inventory it holds for the second-period market.
We show the reaction curves in the model with inventories. We then find that
inventories may be used by labour-managed firms to facilitate tacit collusion.
42 Kazuhiro Ohnishi
The Model
Let us consider a two-period model with two labour-managed profit
-per-worker-maximizing firms, firm 1 and firm 2. In the remainder of this paper,
when i and j are used to refer to firms in an expression, they should be understood to
refer to 1 and 2 with i j¹ . In addition, the subscript denotes the firm, and the
superscript denotes the period. There is no possibility of entry or exit. The price of





2  denotes the aggregate sales of
each period. We assume that P' < 0 and P'' > 0 .
The game runs as follows. In the first period, each firm simultaneously and
independently chooses its first-period production [ )qi
1 0Î ¥,  and its first-period sale 
[ ]s qi i1 10Î , . Firm i ’s inventory I i
1  becomes q si i
1 1- . At the end of the first period, each firm 
observes the behaviour of the other firm. In the second period, each firm
simultaneously and independently chooses its second-period production [ )qi
2 0Î ¥, . At 
the end of the second period, each firm sales s I qi i i
2 1 2= +  and holds no inventory. For
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Î ¥( , )0  is firm i’s constant marginal cost, f
i
Î ¥( , )0  is firm i’s fixed cost,
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We use subgame perfection as our equilibrium concept.
Results
In this section, we show the reaction curves of the model described in the previous
section. We derive firm i’s reaction functions from (2). In the first period, since there
is no inventory available, firm i ’s reaction function is defined by
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In the second period, firm i’s reaction function without inventory is defined by
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and thus its best response is shown as follows:
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When the inventory is zero, the first-order condition for firm i is
( ' ) ( ) 'P s P c l Ps c s f l
i i i i i i i i
+ - - - - = 0 (6)
and the second-order condition is
( ' ' ' ) ( ) ' 'P s P l Ps c s f l
i i i i i i i
+ - - - <2 0 (7)
Furthermore, we have
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(8)
Since l l s li i i i
' ' ',> - <0 0, so that P s l P l s li i i i i' ' '( )
'+ -  is positive; that is, R s
i j
( ) is upward
sloping. This means that firm i treats s
i
t  as strategic complements.3
Both firms’ reaction curves are drawn in Figure 1. R
i
 is firm i’s reaction curve
with no inventory. Both firms’ reaction curves are upward sloping. The equilibrium
is decided in a Cournot fashion, i.e., the intersection of firm 1’s and firm 2’s reaction
curves gives us the equilibrium of the game. The reaction curves cross twice. Only
point B is a stable Cournot equilibrium, since in point A firm 2’s reaction curve
crosses firm 1’s from above.
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Figure 1: 
Next, we consider the case with high inventories, which is drawn in Figure 2. By
holding inventories, firm i’s best response becomes (5). When firm 1 holds I
1
1 , its best 
response becomes the bold lines, and when firm 2 holds I
2
1 , its best response becomes 
the bold broken lines. The intersection of firm 1’s and firm 2’s reaction curves gives
us the equilibrium of the game. Hence, we see that holding inventories changes the
equilibrium of the game.
If only firm 1 holds inventories, then there are three Cournot Nash equilibria,
namely A , B and C . Here, B and C are stable equilibria. From Figure 2, we can see
easily that each firm’s profit per worker is lower at C than at A . If only firm 2 holds
inventories, then A , B and E are Cournot Nash equilibria. In addition, if each firm
holds I
i
1 , then A , B and D are Cournot Nash equilibria. In this figure, B , C , D and E
are stable equilibria. However, each firm’s profit per worker is very low at the points
C , D and E . Therefore, we see that high inventories are not profitable for each firm.
Finally, we consider the case with low inventories, which is drawn in Figure 3. By









1 , its best response
becomes the bold broken lines.
If only firm 1 holds inventories, then A , B and F are Cournot Nash equilibria. If
firm 2’s reaction curve and firm 1’s isoprofit-per-worker curve come in contact with
each other at F , then F is firm 1’s Stackelberg leader point. From Figure 3, we can see
that each firm’s profit per worker is higher at F than at B .




Furthermore, if both firms hold inventories, then A , B and G are Cournot Nash
equilibria. In this figure, B , F , G and H are stable equilibria. Each firm’s profit per
worker is higher at G than at B . If both firms’ isoprofit-per-worker curves come in
contact with each other at G , then G is a collusive outcome. Therefore, we see that
low inventories are profitable for both firms.
Conclusion
We have examined a two-period model in which two labour-managed firms are
allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device. In the first period, each
labour-managed firm simultaneously and independently chooses how much it sells in 
the current market and the level of inventory it holds for the second-period market.
We have presented the reaction curves in the model with inventories. We have shown 
that low inventories are profitable for labour-managed firms, whereas high
inventories are not. We have then found that inventories may be used by
labour-managed firms to facilitate tacit collusion.
NOTES
1 See Ireland and Law (1982), Stephan (1982), Bonin and Putterman (1987) and Putterman (2008) for
excellent surveys of labour-managed firms.
2 Matsumura (1999) considers a Cournot duopoly model in which profit-maximizing firms can hold
inventories as a strategic device.
3 The concept of strategic complements is introduced by Bulow et al. (1985b).
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